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M ANY OF YOU will have seen the press photo of 102 
year-old Bessie Scott, preparing to 
deliver the ball for the rugby test 
between the All Blacks and the 
Springboks on the lOth of July. She 
was chosen through a competition; 
the 70 year-old woman who sug-
gested her said she would be an 
appropriate choice in the Interna-
tional Year of Older Persons, be-
cause she had "shown courage, 
determina tion and strength in her 
lifetime, just as our rugby players 
do today" .1 Bessie Scott, we were 
told, is fiercely independent and 
still lives alone in her Mosgiel 
home. Although officials decided to 
drive her onto the field, she could 
have walked instead. She is a keen 
rugby fan, though she had never 
before seen a test match live. 
From this picture and its accom-
panying story, it would be easy to 
conclude that all is well with the 
way New Zealand sees, and treats, 
its older citizens. But the following 
week brought a different media 
story linking rugby and old age . A 
group of former All Blacks went 
public with complaints about the 
quality of the seats they were of-
fered for top matches. These sea ts 
were not free, they cost the usual 
amount. Kevin Skinner, the hero of 
'56, was particularly critical: he said 
it was not much use going to a 
match if you could "hardly see the 
other end of the paddock", and he 
had stopped going to tests as a 
result. It was galling to see the way 
the Auckland Rugby Union treated 
former All Blacks, the people who 
had made the game what it is today, 
compared with the "corporate 
people, who wouldn't know one 
end of a football from another ... 
They've forgotten all about us. 
Bugger them."' 
These two stories represent two 
apparently contradictory perspec-
tives on old age: indomitability and 
"fierce independence", leading to 
recognition and respect, versus 
decline and replacement, leading to 
forgetting and neglect. But in an 
odd reversal of the usual stere-
otypes, here the lone older woman 
has become the role model, the 
independent, strong, heroic figure, 
while the former All Blacks have 
become the denied and forgotten 
outsiders, relega ted to inferior 
status. The Bessie Scott story repre-
sents the old as active, determined 
and involved individuals, receiving 
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their rightful due from a respectful 
society which recognises their 
human value. By contrast, the 
message of the Kevin Skinner story 
is that regardless of their continued 
presence or their past contribution, 
once they ou tlive their use-by date 
the old will be ignored and ne-
glected by a thankless society which 
recognises nothing but current 
wealth and power. 
These perspectives are two sides 
of the same coin. Unusually, in this 
case they are expressed through the 
voices of older people themselves . 
But in another way they are typical 
of many media stories which appear 
to be about individuals, but are 
ultimately about social attitudes 
and practices: they centre on excep-
tions, so that they reverse the real-
ity . In real life, lone old women are 
much more likely to encounter lack 
of recognition and neglect, and to be 
unable to get what they want, than 
groups of former masculine heroes 
are. 
Moreover, Bessie Scott made 
such an impression precisely be-
cause old women rarely have such 
public visibility. But the majority of 
older people are female. Women are 
58 percent of all those aged 65 and 
over. In the group aged 80 or more, 
they outnumber men by two to 
one-' Yet in looking at old age, it is 
common to take minority male 
patterns as the norm. Women are 
either ignored altogether, or treated 
as a deviant minority. 
I will return to gender issues 
later. But now I want to shift the 
foc us away from representations of 
"oldness" as embodied in individu-
als to broader representations of 
oldness in general. 
There are two important ways in 
which oldness is currently being 
seen in New Zealand. First is what 
can be called the discourse of vul-
nerability. Here the focus is on the 
bodily experience of ageing and its 
consequences. Growing old has 
traditionally been seen as a process 
of inevitable decline, resulting in 
increasing physical and in some 
cases mental impairment. The 
dominant medical perspective does 
not counter this view. Instead it 
seeks to cure disease and stave off 
death for individuals by increas-
ingly heroic medical intervention. 
In some circumstances it pays no 
attention the quali ty of life which 
results . 
But there is now a growing 
counter-view which looks beyond 
the medical model, and focuses 
instead on how the older population 
as a whole can best be helped to 
remain as free as possible from 
impairment. We can call this the 
public health perspective. It stresses 
broad-spectrum collective measures 
such as education and prevention, 
combined w ith self-help, prompt 
rehabilitation, and co-ordinated 
community support. It brings into 
view the social components of 
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vulnerability, such as isolation or 
care-giver stress, wh ich may lead to 
depression or abuse. It also empha-
sises the social components which 
protect against vulnerability. For 
example, an Australian study notes 
that "A substantial international 
literature is developing on quantita-
tive studies showing ways in which 
family and other social support may 
protect against illness, enhance 
coping w ith stress, and improve 
illness outcomes"' 
This public health perspective 
may be time-bound; that is, it may 
appear to accept the commonly held 
notion that vulnerability in old age 
is largely determined by what 
happens after old age begins, when-
ever that is taken to be. The broad-
est versions of the public hea lth 
perspective, however, see experi-
ence in old age as continuous with 
and heavily affected by previous 
experience. The latest available 
information and research suggests 
that about 50 percent of the varia-
tion in human life-span after age 30 
can be put down to survival at-
tributes that are fixed- that is, they 
can no longer be altered- for indi-
viduals by the time they turn 30. 
What is more, only a third to a half 
of this 50 percent is due to genetic 
factors. The other half to two-thirds 
is due to non-genetic survival 
attributes, such as socioeconomic 
status, nutrition h istory and disease 
history. The longer people live, the 
more their li fe-span may be deter-
mined by factors that are fixed by 
age 305 
Therefore the level of vulnerabil-
ity in old age depends mainly on 
factors such as where the society's 
' floor' is set - that is, wha t standard 
of living is seen as the line below 
w hich no one should be allowed to 
fa ll, from birth to death; and how 
equally access to the key resources, 
such as income, health care, hous-
ing, educa tion and social participa-
tion, is distributed. To see old age 
and the old more clearly, it is vitally 
important that we recognise this 
connection. 
Both the medical view and the 
public health view take the value of 
older people and old age for 
granted. But a very different view of 
older people is now surfacing. It is 
exemplified in a 1997 article by one 
of the National Business Review's 
gentlemen columnists. The headline 
is "Elderly's welfare appetite gives 
everyone a pain". The article makes 
great play of the fact that "an old-
old female costs the government 10 
times as much as a 20 year-old " ' 
We could call this the cost-benefit 
perspective. It focuses not on vul-
nerability itself, but on the cost of 
vulnerability to taxpayers, who are 
assumed to be a different group 
from the old. This cost-benefit 
perspective sees public spending on 
health care for the old as already 
grossly excessive, warns of massive 
increases to come, and urges that it 
be cut in favour of spending on the 
unmet needs of the young. This 
perspective seems to have been 
largely imported to New Zealand 
from the United States, where 
health care provision is quite differ-
ently structured. There the state 
funds a much higher proportion of 
health care for the old than for any 
other age group. In the 1980s, for US 
citizens aged under 65, only about 
29 percent of health expenses were 
paid by public programmes.' The 
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core problem is not the excessive 
cost of health care for the old, 
although in a mainly private sys-
tem, costs do escalate as a result of 
market forces. It is the fa ilure to 
meet the health care needs of other 
age groups. 
The underlying assumptions of 
the cost-benefit perspective show 
that the way oldness is seen de-
pends heavily on the way human 
existence itself is seen. What are 
these assumptions? First, that 
longer life and greater numbers of 
older people will inevitably mean 
much higher health costs. Secondly, 
that adequate collectively funded 
health care for all throughout life is 
unafford ab le. Thirdly, that public 
health care spending is wasted on 
the old, especially the old-old (85 
and over), because they are "past 
working". The implication is that 
the strictly limited public funds 
available for health care should 
instead be invested in more produc-
tive or potentially productive stages 
of life. Once the old have used up 
their meagre health care ration, they 
should be required to fund the rest 
themselves. 
This perspective ignores the fact 
that in a healthy society, it is gener-
ally the old who use the largest 
share of the services offered by 
modern medicine, just as it is the 
young who make the most use of 
the formal educa tion system. If New 
Zealand's notoriously high rates of 
car accidents, childhood injuries 
and domestic violence, for example, 
were to fa ll steeply, the proportion 
of public health spending taken up 
by services for older people would 
rise, even if no more was spent on 
them. This shift would represent a 
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marked improvement in overall 
health. Conversely, if funding for 
cheap and effective interventions 
needed by the old, such as cataract 
operations, is repeatedly swallowed 
up by emergency and acute care, or 
funding for community support is 
not available, the level of vulner-
ability among older people is un-
necessarily increased, along with 
their need for assistance. The over-
all costs are of course increased too. 
Even more significantly, the 
cost-benefit perspective can operate 
only by ignoring the human life 
cycle and the interconnections 
across genera tions. It requires us to 
see each stage of life as separate and 
distinct. Its basic premise is that the 
young have no connection with the 
old; instead they must compete 
against the old, in a zero-sum game 
which sets children and grandchil-
dren against their parents and 
grandparents, and each genera tion 
against their own future selves. This 
absurd premise bears very little 
relation to the way a modern society 
operates. 
But at least there is now a lively 
public debate about vulnerability in 
old age. There is much less public 
debate about the second major way 
of seeing oldness which I want to 
talk about today. It has strong links 
with the cost-benefit perspective on 
vulnerability. The best name for it is 
the discourse of dependency. 
This discourse of dependency is 
far from new. But over the last 15 
years it has been dramatically 
reshaped and redeployed in New 
Zealand. At first glance the reason 
is obvious: the predicted growth in 
the numbers and proportion of 
older people. Professor Pool has 
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provided an expert overview of the 
demographics. But in the media the 
demographics all too often turn into 
a stream of alarmist and often 
inaccurate projections, emphasising 
the growth in the proportion of 
older people compared w ith 
younger adults, and implying that 
this shift is entirely negative. 
However, the numbers should 
be seen as something of a red her-
ring. The reshap ing of dependence 
as applied to old age, or to any 
other category, is not being driven 
solely or even p rimarily by the 
demographic facts. 
Imagine that around the year 
2010, just as the baby-boomers start 
turning 65, a virulent new form of 
auto-immune disease emerges and 
begins to kill off 5 out of every 10 
people aged 70 or more. It quickly 
becomes clear that there will be no 
old age boom after all. Yet the 
discourse of dependency would not 
be fundamentally affected, although 
its rationale might alter. What 
matters is the viewpoint and the 
assumptions behind it. To take a 
different example: one of the main 
arguments for the transfer of state 
owned enterprises into private 
hands was financia l loss and mis-
management. But now lean, well-
run, undeniably profitable busi-
nesses such as the Meteorological 
Service are to be put up fo r sale, 
precisely because they are profit-
able. In terms of ageing, the num-
bers game is merely the convenient 
pretext for a reinterpretation which 
would have occurred anyway. It is 
not to do with demographic change; 
it is to do w ith the repeal of the 
welfare state, the destruction of 
collective social structures, and the 
concentration of power and wealth 
in fewer hands. 
The discourse of dependency 
has been reshaped around what 
looks like a simple pair of concepts: 
dependence and independence. To 
understand how these concepts 
have been constructed, and how 
significant they have become in how 
oldness is seen, we need to shift our 
foc us away from the concepts 
themselves to the relationships 
between them. In particular, as 
Jonathan Culler puts it, we need to 
look closely at "the differences 
between them which the system 
employs and endows with signifi-
cance". 8 Only by doing this can we 
begin to unders tand how the de-
pendency discourse works. 
What is the difference between 
dependence and independence? In 
terms of daily living, it revolves 
around the issue of personal assist-
ance. People are said to be depend-
ent when they need someone to 
help them with daily living in some 
way. Bessie Scott's "fierce inde-
pendence" refers to both her ability 
to look after herself, and her refusal 
to accept any assistance. This is the 
norm for adults, and the old do not 
usually want to fall short of it. 
Yet thousands of people, regard-
less of age, do not meet this norm. 
They may not know how to do their 
own washing, cook their own meals 
or clean their own houses. Instead 
they rely on others- usually women 
- to do this for them. An Australian 
study shows how deeply the expec-
tation that women will support 
their husbands in this way is in-
grained: it found that in a group of 
older couples, after the wives be-
came frail and disabled, half con tin-
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ued to prepare the meals for their 
non-frail husbands, and one-third 
continued to have responsibili ty for 
the housework. 9 
Socioeconomic changes, such as 
the shift from local shops and 
deliveries to scattered self-service 
supermarkets, may turn the previ-
ously independent into the partially 
dependent regard less of their own 
capabilities. And in a modern urban 
society, everyone depends daily on 
the skills and reliability of number-
less others, from sewer cleaners to 
air traffic controllers. 
As soon as we start to question 
dependence and independence as a 
taken-for-granted pair of opposites, 
we can see that they are not oppo-
sites at all, and cannot be used to 
label life stages. Lifelong interde-
pendence is a much more useful 
perspective. Nevertheless, the 
fictional norm of personal inde-
pendence as the mark of full adult 
sta tus remains. The particular kinds 
of personal dependence which 
contravene this norm become stig-
matised, because they represent a 
regression from adulthood and a 
loss of autonomy. 
When it comes to money in-
come, the difference between de-
pendence and independence 
changes shape. It revolves around 
the issue of where the money comes 
from, and why it comes. The Bessie 
Scott story highlights the shift that 
has taken place in this meaning of 
dependence over the last 15 years. 
There is now a prominent point of 
view which would refuse to see her 
as "fiercely independent" at all, 
because she gets her basic income 
from the state. And unlike Roger 
Estall, Michael Wall, or Christine 
Rankin, she does not get it in return 
for her current labour, or as a result 
of her past paid employment, but 
simply for having lived more than a 
set number of years . 
Getting your main income in the 
fo rm of a collectively funded state 
benefit is now defined as depend-
ence. Independence is defined as 
getting an income in any other way, 
except perhaps from the proceeds of 
crime. So by definition, almost all 
those who have reached old age are 
dependent, along with the unem-
ployed, the sick, invalids, the wid-
owed, care-givers, sole parents, and 
all their children. The one group 
which has remained exempt from 
this label of dependence is war 
veterans. Significantly, this is also 
the only group which is steadily 
shrinking in numbers. 
Why have the old come to be 
seen in this light? The ready answer 
is "because they have stopped 
earning a living from paid work". In 
her 1988 paper for the Royal Com-
mission on Social Policy, "Perspec-
tives on the Elderly", Peggy 
Koopman-Boyden echoed many 
overseas authors, and foreshad-
owed many New Zealand ones, 
when she blamed the fact that the 
old are seen as dependent on retire-
ment. She describes retirement as "a 
form of socially created dependency 
in old age". Some pages fur ther on, 
it becomes " the major cause of the 
inequalities faced in old age". Later 
still, it is seen as "the single most 
important factor contributing to the 
depressed social status of the eld -
erly, and ... part of the general 
tendency to devalue the worth of 
elderly people". 10 
The logical next step in this 
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argument is obvious. In order to 
shed the stigmatised status of 
dependence, people should be 
permitted- or compelled- to 
remain in paid work regardless of 
their age. The British author David 
Green took the same line in his 
work for the Business Round table in 
1996. He wrote, "Retirement from 
work has attractions but in the 
modern world it seems to signal the 
end of useful life, and this may 
explain the low esteem in which 
older people are often held."" How 
can this be remedied? Green has the 
answer: "The duty of self support 
means we should retire only when 
we can afford to do so. People who 
have not saved enough to live on, or 
to buy an annuity of sufficient size, 
cannot afford to retire, and should 
carry on working for as long as 
possible." 12 
The first problem with this way 
of seeing dependence and old age is 
that it takes so much for granted. It 
is true that the practice of ceasing 
full-time paid work at a set age is 
socially constructed. It was intro-
duced not to benefit workers, but to 
serve the interests of employers, 
who were, in the words of retire-
ment historian William Graebner, 
"rationally and aggressively in 
search of efficiency and productiv-
ity"n It stemmed from the idea that 
an ageing workforce was a menace 
to progress. This was not only 
because older workers could not 
keep up with the speeded-up pace 
of work (many younger workers 
could not keep up either). Older 
workers were also seen as too set in 
their ways - including their union 
loyalties and organising experience. 
As Graebner points out, retirement 
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was not a device for creating em-
ployment. It was merely a device 
for redistributing existing employ-
ment.14 
But short of mass starvation, 
mass retirement at set ages could 
gain ground only when the powers 
of government enabled pensions to 
be introduced. Pensions were ac-
ceptable not only because they were 
humane and suited employers; but 
also because consumption, rather 
than production, came to be seen as 
the solution to the problems of an 
economy which was producing 
more than it could sell. Material 
poverty does not mean being unable 
to produce; it means being unable to 
consume. Pensions enabled workers 
to survive retirement; but more 
importantly, they enabled them to 
continue consuming, even if only at 
a very low level, regardless of how 
the economy was faring. So it was 
hoped that paying pensions would 
counteract the business cycle and 
help to stave off depression. 
To offset the strength of the 
existing mythology of labour, over 
the years a mythology of retirement 
was constructed. Remnants of this 
mythology can still be seen in the 
few television advertisements 
which portray older people. These 
advertisements feature a narrow 
range of products and services, such 
as retirement funds and fibrous 
breakfast cereals. They show older 
people in general, but particularly 
older men, indulging in an endless 
series of energetic romps with their 
grandchildren, or improbable and 
expensive leisure pursuits, such as 
sailing or playing the saxophone. 
This mythology of retirement is 
now under attack. Full-time market 
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work, as the norm which all adults 
must continually strive to meet, has 
become the basic premise underpin-
ning all income support policies. 
There has been a steady growth of 
emphasis on the value and indeed 
the duty of paid employment for all 
adults of "working age", with little 
or no regard to gender, marital and 
parental status, disability, ill-health, 
earning capacity, or unpaid work 
responsibilities. Levels of unem-
ployment, underemployment and 
overemployment, and changing 
labour market conditions, get no 
significant consideration either. 
There have even been calls for a 
return to treating children as not 
only capable of paid work, but able 
to benefit from combining it with 
schooling (in a system where educa-
tion is supplied wholly by private 
providers). 15 While these calls have 
not as yet had much serious atten-
tion in New Zealand, what at first 
seemed equally outrageous sugges-
tions have eventually reappeared as 
government policy. 
Over the last ten years, the 
boundaries of legitimate reasons for 
receiving collectively funded in-
come support have closed in like 
the walls of a medieval torture 
machine, until almost no space is 
left inside them, and what space 
there is becomes intolerable. So it is 
not surprising that there are now 
increasingly frequent calls for age to 
be added to the list of invalid rea-
sons for state income support-
particularly universal support. The 
apparent overall improvement in 
the health status, as well as the 
longevity, of the old is used as 
another reason for ceasing to ex-
empt them from the obligation to 
seek paid work. An increasing flood 
of articles, books and programmes 
paints a picture of a rapidly grow-
ing group of healthy, skilled, expe-
rienced older people chafing under 
the yoke of forced retirement and 
discriminatory hiring policies, and 
both eager and able to stay in or 
resume paid work. This perspective 
sees severe ill-health as the only 
va lid reason for stopping paid 
work. It sees the demonstrated 
inability to support yourself, or to 
save enough to support yo urself, as 
the only valid reason for income 
support in old age. 
There has certainly been consid-
erable improvement in the health 
status of older people. But this 
improvement has been very uneven. 
As the National Health Committee 
noted in 1998, high socioeconomic 
groups are in a much more favour-
able position than low socioeco-
nomic groups. The groups that 
already had the lowest mortality 
rates have showed the biggest 
health gains. People with the lowest 
incomes report the poorest hea lth at 
every age. The more unequal the 
distribution of incomes, the worse 
the hea lth inequalities. Primarily it 
is deprivation which leads to poor 
hea lth, ra ther than vice versa . As 
the information on longevity shows, 
ea rly health inequalities are com-
pounded over the yea rs. In New 
Zealand this gap has not closed in 
recent years, and may have wid-
ened. " 
But li ke the numbers of older 
people, the health of older people is 
beside the point. Retirement and 
pensions were not introduced 
primarily out for concern for work-
ers' health, and they are not being 
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decried now primarily out of con-
cern about the status and self-
esteem of older people, or out of 
interest in the skills and experience 
they have to offer. As Or David 
Thomson explained two weeks ago, 
and as a growing number of people 
in their 40s, 50s and 60s already 
know, being available for paid work 
does not mean having paid work. 
Working hours which are too long 
for parents are also too long for 
older people. Part time, short-term 
jobs which do not pay enough for fit 
young adults to live on, let alone to 
support children, will not keep 
someone in their 60s either. It seems 
quite pointless to focus on the 
continuing ability of older people to 
earn a li ving when the labour mar-
ket is alread y patently failing to 
provide so many of those under 65 
with employment which lasts long 
enough, pays enough, and leaves 
enough time to carry out unpaid 
work, let alone enjoy leisure. In the 
circumstances, it seems eminently 
sensib le to continue to provide an 
income which is high enough to 
enable older people to leave the 
labour market. 
Once again, it is necessary to 
stress that paid work is not the only 
way in which people contribu te to 
their communities. To argue that 
the shift from earning to retirement 
and reliance on a state pension 
crea tes dependency is to assume 
tha t it is na tural to see the absence 
of paid work in a wholly negative 
light. If the old are not valued 
primarily because they do not work 
for pay, then instead of asking how 
they can be helped - or compelled -
to join or rejoin the workforce, we 
should be questioning the moral 
economy which sets such a high 
value on employment, and such a 
low value on other occupations. 
And we should ask why the value 
of employment is being emphasised 
so strongly now in connection with 
old age . We must conclude that the 
main reasons are to lower wages 
and conditions by increasing the 
competition for jobs, to cut back the 
state's obligations in order to reduce 
the taxes paid by the most affluent, 
and to erode the last bastion of 
belief in the concept of universal 
collective support. 
There is a second major p roblem 
with seeing oldness in the light of 
dependency. I hope that many of 
you will ha ve spotted this problem 
by now. 
Paying so much attention to 
retirement assumes that most peo-
ple experience it. It has been called 
"a full-fledged ideology embodying 
a way of life and a way of thinking 
about the experience of being old." 17 
But both this ideology and the 
current attacks on it are based on 
male employment norms which 
have not previously applied to most 
women in New Zealand, and are 
now rapidly disappearing for men 
too. 
The growing focus on retirement 
and dependence makes old women 
more invisible than ever. In fact, 
much of the discourse on ageing 
continues to ignore or sideline 
women 's experiences, even though 
they so clearly make up the majority 
of the old . The report of the prime 
ministerial task force on positive 
ageing, for example, was almost 
entirely devoid of any discussion of 
gender differences. 18 Many discus-
sions of retirement pay no attention 
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to gender at all, or else treat women 
as a minority "special case". 
This is consistent with a general 
trend to see women as no different 
from men in terms of paid work and 
ea rning ability. 19 It is true that the 
pattern of women's involvement in 
the labour force is now moving 
closer to men's. But the reverse is 
also true. Part-time work, job inse-
curity and breaks in employment 
are spreading among men too, and 
their labour force participation is 
falling as women 's rises. 
Yet women's median ea rnings 
remain much lower than men's. 
Census data clearly shows that the 
years before 20 and the years after 
65 are the only periods when wom-
en's and men's median incomes are 
roughly equal. There is little evi-
dence that this situation w ill change 
on a broad scale. Although a small 
percentage of women will join the 
top income decile, the gap between 
this top decile and all others will 
continue to widen. At the bottom 
end, the percentage of households 
where no ad ult has paid work will 
continue to grow. 
The rough equality in old age 
between men and women in terms 
of income is entirely due to our 
egalitarian pension system, which is 
not linked to paid work. In stark 
contrast to the discourse of depend-
ency, it does not rank recipients on 
the basis of their paid work involve-
ment, past, present or future . But 
almost every other type of benefit 
now does thi s. In terms of income 
security and predictability, the 
benefit rules are constantly altering. 
As for wages, since 1982 real 
average wages have declined for all 
but the top two income deciles, 
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while job insecurity has dramati-
cally increased. So superannuation 
is coming to be seen as more gener-
ous and more secure than many 
other sources of income, despite the 
many twists and turns in govern-
ment policy on it. 
To see more than a tiny fraction 
of the old as unduly privileged, or 
basic pension rates as overly gener-
ous, is a delusion. It would make no 
sense to make the lives of many 
older people intolerable because of 
the worsening plight of others who 
receive their main income from 
state benefits, and increasing num-
bers of those who have paid work-
any more than it made sense to 
remove market rents for state hous-
ing, and reduce low income state 
and private tenants alike to a level 
playing field of misery. 
However, it must be remem-
bered that in 1991, national super-
annuation was reduced overnight to 
a harshly means- and assets-tested 
benefit. The repea l of this change is 
one of the few instances where the 
government has been forced to 
reverse a major policy degrading a 
statutory benefit. But in 1999, the 
married rate of superannuation was 
allowed to fall to 60 percent of the 
average wage. For single or wid-
owed older people who live alone, 
the rate was to fa ll to just 35 percent 
of the average wage. In this group, 
women outnumber men by two to 
one. 
It is ironic that just as women 's 
paid work pa tterns (although not 
their earnings or their unpaid work) 
move closer to those of men, one of 
the few truly equal rights which 
New Zealand women have- that is, 
the right to be exempt from paid 
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work obligations and to receive a 
universal pension at a set age - is 
coming under sustained attack. If 
these rights are removed, it is 
women who will suffer most. The 
blinkered discourse of dependency 
leaves them facing an impossible 
dilemma: they will be expected to 
go on providing the lioness's share 
of support for those who need it in 
old age, while simultaneously either 
earning their own living, or existing 
on a means-tes ted, asset-tested, 
poverty-level benefit. 
There is another light in which 
older women, in particular, can be 
seen. They pose the ultima te chal-
lenge to market values. They rarely 
have paid work: despite all the 
changes to superannuation, the 
percentage of women aged 65 and 
over in full-time paid work, or 
looking for it, is just 1.7%, only very 
slightly higher than in 1981; and 
while the percentage in part-time 
paid work has almost doubled since 
1981, it is still only 3.5%. 20 
Older women can no longer 
produce children. They are not 
usually shown as sexually active or 
attractive to men. The major part of 
their lives has usually been spent 
doing unpaid work, which is invis-
ible to and devalued by the market. 
Eventually they may no longer be 
able to take care of others any more; 
and they may require help from 
others to take care of themselves. In 
other words, they have no market 
value at all. Yet their numbers are 
grow ing around the w orld. By 2025, 
over 25 percent of all New Zealand 
women (and between 30 and 40 
percent of women in the US, Europe 
and Japan) will be 65 or older. 
If these women have no value, 
then human life itself has no value. 
What is the point of increased 
longevity, if the old are not worth 
supporting as human beings in their 
own right? 
It is hard to come to terms with 
ageing. Unlike other animals, we 
remember our youth too well. 
Moreover, the market scenario of 
endless material growth depends on 
perpetuating the illusion that age-
ing does not exist. The lot of older 
people in New Zealand is far from 
perfect. Inequalities and differences 
in life chances are magnified in old 
age. Far too many older people-
especially women, who are much 
more likely to spend their later 
years living alone than men are-
become disconnected from their 
families and communities, through 
fear, personal circumstances, social 
structures, or sheer lack of re-
sources. 
But more clearly than any other 
stage of life, old age gives the lie to 
the notion that we exist solely to 
produce more and consume more 
market goods, and that human 
community can be sustained on a 
basis of user pays. Growing old 
demonstrates that there is life 
beyond paid production- even 
beyond reproduction - and there is 
growth beyond the market. If we 
end up giving in to the cost-benefit 
perspective and the discourse of 
dependency, and we deny the right 
to continue living- not just merely 
surviving- to those who are no 
longer productive in market terms, 
we will have lost the moral right to 
a fu ture. If we allow a narrow 
philosophy of market values to rule, 
leaving our society unable to rise to 
the challenge of much greater 
N E W :z_E A L A N D S T U D I E S 
numbers and proportions of older 
people, we will have profoundly 
failed to come to terms with our 
humanity. <5l? 
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